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TRIAL BY A JURY

CPLR 4102(c): Failure to oppose consolidation nwtion held to
constitute a waiver of trial by a jury.
One of the primary advantages of a merged system of law
and equity is that it is conducive to the determination of both legal
and equitable claims in a single action. Problems, however, with
respect to the right to jury trial have plagued the merged system
from its inception.
Prior to the enactment of the CPLR there was confusion as
to whether or not a waiver of trial by jury resulted when a plaintiff joined legal and equitable causes of action arising out of
separate transactions.4 0 In order to resolve the conflict of authority,
CPLR 4102(c) provides that where a party has two or more
causes of action against another party or parties he shall not be
deemed to have waived his right to trial by jury upon a claim, by
joining it with another claim, arising out of a separate transaction,
with respect to which there is no right to trial by jury. Conversely,
where a plaintiff either joins legal and equitable causes of action
arising out of the same transaction or seeks both legal and equitable relief for the same cause of action he is deemed to have waived
his right to a jury trial.41 This is a desirable solution, for if a
claimant were to risk a ruling that he has waived the right to jury
trial he might be encouraged to bring separate causes of action, and
such would seem contrary
to the CPLR's policy of promoting lib42
eral joinder of action.
By analogy it would seem, then, that the provision relating to
joinder would apply to situations wherein the plaintiff seeks to
consolidate both legal and equitable claims. Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether failure to object to a defendant's motion
to consolidate legal and equitable claims arising out of the same
transaction would amount to a waiver by the plaintiff of his right
to a jury trial on the legal issues. A pre-CPLR case held that it
did, on the broad ground that where a plaintiff seeks legal and
equitable relief in respect to the same wrong, his right to trial by

40 Compare Ehrle v. Sutton Place Apartments, Inc., 137 Misc. 122, 241
N.Y.S. 386 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930), aff'd without opinion, 231 App.

Div. 712, 246 N.Y.S. 866 (1st Dep't 1930) (granting jury trial), with
Lavisch v. Schwartz, 235 App. Div. 18, 256 N.Y.S. 416 (3d Dep't 1932)
(denying jury trial). See also SECOND
43 Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans
(1917); Cogswell v. New York, N. H.
518 (1887); Hirsch v. Flick, 17 App.
Dep't 1962).
42 See

CPLR 601,

REP. 574-75.
Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993
& H. R. R., 105 N.Y. 319, 11 N.E.
Div. 2d 961, 233 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2d
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jury is lost.4 3

Similarly in a recent appellate division case, Tanne

v. Tanne,44 the court, in a per curiam opinion, held that failure to
oppose a motion to consolidate actions arising out of the same
transaction amounted to a waiver of the plaintiff's right to trial by
jury.
Courts should not presume that a party has waived so substantial a right as trial by jury when confronted with ambiguous
conduct. Although inaction is often a prima facie indication of
waiver, it would seem questionable to attach such a consequence
to the failure to oppose consolidation motions which are favored
and frequently granted. Nevertheless, Tanne stands upon firm
ground and warns of the harsh result which can arise upon failure
to oppose defendant's motion for consolidation of legal and equitable causes of action.
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ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5201: Second Circuit upholds constitutionality of "Seider"
attachment.

In Minichiello v. Rosenberg,45 the United States Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, by a 2-1 decision, has upheld the constitutionality of a "Seider" attachment.4
The action was commenced
in the New York supreme court by attaching the foreign defendant's liability insurance policy. The defendant, on the basis of
diversity of citizenship, sought and obtained removal to the District
Court for the Western District of New York. Once in the district
court, a motion was made to dismiss on the ground that the
"Seider" procedure is unconstitutional. This motion was denied.
4
However, since the Southern District, in Podolsky v. DeVinney, 7
had previously declared that Seider is unconstitutional, a certificate
to appeal to the Court of Appeals was issued.
"1Lavisch v. Schwartz, 235 App. Div. 18, 256 N.Y.S. 416 (3d Dep't
1932): "where plaintiff consented to have the action at law and the action

in equity tried together in effect as one suit, this constituted a waiver of
his right to a trial by jury. . . ." Compare Judge Cardozo's defense of
the constitutionality of the waiver doctrine in Di Menna v. Cooper &
Evans, 220 N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993 (1917); If plaintiff elects to take advantage of equitable relief "he elects that the whole controversy in all its
aspects, may be determined by the court. . . . One cannot be heard to urge
as a breach of one's constitutional right the concession of a remedy which
one has one's self demanded." Id. at 395, 115 N.E. at 994 (emphasis added).
The reasoning of Schwartz would seem to be a curious extension of Di
Menna.
4430 App. Div. 2d 956, 294 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1st Dep't 1968).
45 - F.2d (2d Cir. 1968).
46 Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1966).
47281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

